

Lecture 5: Logic Programming

2-AIN-108 Computational Logic

Martin Baláž, Martin Homola

Department of Applied Informatics
Faculty of Mathematics, Physics and Informatics
Comenius University in Bratislava



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Example

father(*abraham*, *isaac*) ←
mother(*sarah*, *isaac*) ←
father(*isaac*, *jacob*) ←
parent(*X*, *Y*) ← *father*(*X*, *Y*)
parent(*X*, *Y*) ← *mother*(*X*, *Y*)
grandparent(*X*, *Z*) ← *parent*(*X*, *Y*) ∧ *parent*(*Y*, *Z*)
ancestor(*X*, *Y*) ← *parent*(*X*, *Y*)
ancestor(*X*, *Z*) ← *parent*(*X*, *Y*) ∧ *ancestor*(*Y*, *Z*)

Definition (Literal)

A **literal** is an atom or the negation of an atom.

Definition (Rule)

A **rule** is a formula of the form

$$L_1 \vee \cdots \vee L_m \leftarrow L_{m+1} \wedge \cdots \wedge L_n$$

where $0 \leq m \leq n$ and each L_i , $0 \leq i \leq n$, is a literal.

Definition (Program)

A **logic program** is a finite set of rules.

Each rule

$$L_1 \vee \cdots \vee L_m \leftarrow L_{m+1} \wedge \cdots \wedge L_n$$

can be viewed as a clause

$$L_1 \vee \cdots \vee L_m \vee \neg L_1 \vee \cdots \vee \neg L_n$$

.

A **fact** is a rule of the form

$$L \leftarrow$$

A **constraint** is a rule of the form

$$\leftarrow L_1 \vee \cdots \vee L_n$$

$$P = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} p(c, Y, Y) \leftarrow \\ p(f(X), Y, Z) \leftarrow p(X, f(Y), Z) \end{array} \right\}$$
$$L = p(f(c), c, f(c))$$

$$P \models L$$

- domain \mathbb{N}
- interpretation function I
 - $c^I = 0$
 - $f^I = x \mapsto x + 1$
 - $p^I = \{(x, y, z) \mid z = x + y\}$
 - $c^I = 1$
 - $f^I = x \mapsto 2 * x$
 - $p^I = \{(x, y, z) \mid z = 2^{x+y}\}$

Herbrand Interpretation

Definition (Herbrand Universe)

A term is **ground** if it does not contain variables.

The **Herbrand universe** is the set \mathcal{U} of all ground terms.

Definition (Herbrand Base)

An atom is **ground** if it does not contain variables.

The **Herbrand base** is the set \mathcal{B} of all ground atoms.

Definition (Herbrand Interpretation)

A **Herbrand interpretation** is an interpretation $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{U}, I)$ such that

$$f^I = (t_1, \dots, t_n) \mapsto f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$$

for each function symbol f with arity n .

$$P = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} p(c, Y, Y) \leftarrow \\ p(f(X), Y, Z) \leftarrow p(X, f(Y), Z) \end{array} \right\}$$
$$L = p(f(c), c, f(c))$$

$$P \models L$$

- domain $\mathcal{U} = \{c, f(c), f(f(c)), f(f(f(c))), \dots\}$
- interpretation function I
 - $c^I = c$
 - $f^I = x \mapsto f(x)$
 - $p^I = \{(x, y, z) \mid x = f^a(c) \wedge y = f^b(c) \wedge z = f^{a+b}(c)\}$

Theorem

A logic program is satisfiable iff it has a Herbrand model.

Proof.

Each Herbrand model is a model, i.e. if a logic program has a Herbrand model, it has a model.

If $\mathcal{I} = (D, I)$ is a model of P then a Herbrand interpretation $\mathcal{J} = (\mathcal{U}, J)$ such that

$$J(p) = \{(t_1, \dots, t_n) \mid I \models p(t_1, \dots, t_n)\}$$

is a Herbrand model of P . □

The previous theorem holds only for clauses, it does not hold for arbitrary closed formulas.

Let S be $\{p(a), (\exists X)\neg p(X)\}$. The Herbrand universe is $\mathcal{U} = \{a\}$ and the Herbrand base is $\mathcal{B} = \{p(a)\}$. We have two Herbrand interpretations, $(\{a\}, I_1)$, $p^{I_1} = \emptyset$ (i.e. $p(a)$ is false), and $(\{a\}, I_2)$, $p^{I_2} = \{(a)\}$ (i.e. $p(a)$ is true). In both cases, S is not satisfied.

But if we take the domain $D = \{0, 1\}$ and the interpretation function I_3 with $a^{I_3} = 0$, $p^{I_3} = \{(0)\}$, then (D, I_3) is a model of S .

Definition (Definite Rule)

A **definite rule** is a rule of the form

$$A_0 \leftarrow A_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge A_n$$

where $0 \leq n$ and each A_i , $0 \leq i \leq n$, is an atom.

Definition (Definite Logic Program)

A logic program is **definite** if it contains only definite rules.

Definition (Definite Goal)

A **definite goal** is a rule of the form

$$\leftarrow A_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge A_n$$

where $0 \leq n$ and each A_i , $1 \leq i \leq n$, is an atom.

Reasoning without Negation

$P \models (\exists X_1) \dots (\exists X_k)(A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_n)$?

Is $P \cup \{\neg(\exists X_1) \dots (\exists X_k)(A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_n)\}$ unsatisfiable?

Is $P \cup \{(\forall X_1) \dots (\forall X_k)(\neg A_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg A_n)\}$ unsatisfiable?

Is $P \cup \{\leftarrow A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_n\}$ unsatisfiable?

The Least Herbrand Model

Lemma

Let P be a definite logic program and \mathcal{M} be a non-empty set of Herbrand models of P . Then $\bigcap_{M \in \mathcal{M}} M$ is a Herbrand model of P .

Theorem

Every definite logic program P has the least Herbrand model (denoted M_P).

Proof.

The set of all Herbrand models is non-empty, because the Herbrand base \mathcal{B} is a model of P . Therefore the intersection of all Herbrand models is the least Herbrand model of P . \square

The Least Herbrand Model

Theorem

Let P be a definite logic program. Then $M_P = \{A \in \mathcal{B}_P \mid P \models A\}$.

Proof.

$P \models A$ iff $P \cup \{\sim A\}$ is unsatisfiable iff $P \cup \{\sim A\}$ has no Herbrand models iff $\sim A$ is false w.r.t. all Herbrand models of P iff A is true w.r.t. all Herbrand models of P iff $A \in M_P$. \square

Immediate Consequence Operator

Definition (Immediate Consequence Operator)

Let P be a definite logic program. An **immediate consequence operator** T_P is defined as follows:

$$T_P(I) = \{A \in \mathcal{B}_P \mid A \leftarrow A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_n \in \text{Ground}(P), \\ \{A_1, \dots, A_m\} \subseteq I\}$$

The iteration $T_P \uparrow n$ is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} T_P \uparrow 0 &= \emptyset \\ T_P \uparrow (n+1) &= T_P(T_P \uparrow n) \\ T_P \uparrow \omega &= \bigcup_{n < \omega} T_P \uparrow n \end{aligned}$$

Theorem

Let M_P be the least model of P . Then $M_P = T_P \uparrow \omega$.

Definition (Normal Rule)

A **normal rule** is a rule of the form

$$A \leftarrow L_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge L_n$$

where $0 \leq n$, A is an atom, and each L_i , $1 \leq i \leq n$, is a literal.

Definition (Normal Logic Program)

A logic program is **normal** if it contains only normal rules.

Definition (Normal Goal)

A **normal goal** is a rule of the form

$$\leftarrow L_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge L_n$$

where $0 \leq n$ and each L_i , $1 \leq i \leq n$, is a literal.

Reasoning with Negation

$P \models (\exists X_1) \dots (\exists X_k)(L_1 \wedge \dots \wedge L_n)?$

Is $P \cup \{\neg(\exists X_1) \dots (\exists X_k)(L_1 \wedge \dots \wedge L_n)\}$ unsatisfiable?

Is $P \cup \{(\forall X_1) \dots (\forall X_k)(\neg L_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg L_n)\}$ unsatisfiable?

Is $P \cup \{\leftarrow L_1 \wedge \dots \wedge L_n\}$ unsatisfiable?

$student(joe) \leftarrow$

$student(bill) \leftarrow$

$P \models student(jim)?$

$P \models \neg student(jim)?$

$student(x) \leftrightarrow x = joe \vee x = bill$

First step:

$$p(x_1, \dots, x_m) \leftarrow x_1 = t_1 \wedge \dots \wedge x_m = t_m \wedge L_1 \wedge \dots \wedge L_n$$

where x_1, \dots, x_m are variables not occurring in $L_1 \wedge \dots \wedge L_n$ and $p(t_1, \dots, t_m) \leftarrow L_1 \wedge \dots \wedge L_n$ is a normal rule.

Second step:

$$p(x_1, \dots, x_m) \leftrightarrow E_1 \vee \dots \vee E_k$$

where each E_i has the form $x_1 = t_1 \wedge \dots \wedge x_m = t_m \wedge L_1 \wedge \dots \wedge L_n$, E_1, \dots, E_k are all transformed rules from the first step with the predicate symbol p in the head, and x_1, \dots, x_m are new variables.